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Inside the “Constitutional Revolution” of 1937 
Barry Cushman 
 
 The nature and sources of the New Deal Constitutional Revolution are among the most 
discussed and debated subjects in constitutional historiography. Scholars have reached 
significantly divergent conclusions concerning how best to understand the meaning and the 
causes of constitutional decisions rendered by the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Charles 
Evans Hughes.1 Though recent years have witnessed certain refinements in scholarly 
understandings of various dimensions of the phenomenon, the relevant documentary record 
seemed to have been rather thoroughly explored. Judicial opinions, case records and appellate 
briefs, congressional hearings and debates, scholarly and popular commentary, and the papers of 
the justices all had been examined in considerable detail. Though further review of the papers of 
government lawyers promised to shed additional light on aspects of the period’s legal and 
constitutional development, it appeared that the portion of the documentary record illuminating 
the intentional states of the justices had been exhausted. 
 Recently, however, a remarkably instructive set of primary sources has become available. 
For many years, the docket books kept by a number of the Hughes Court justices have been held 
                                                          
Barry Cushman is John P. Murphy Foundation Professor of Law, University of Notre 
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1 For a survey and analysis of the scholarly literature, see Barry Cushman, The Jurisprudence of 
the Hughes Court: The Recent Literature, 89 Notre Dame L Rev 1929 (2014). 
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by the Office of the Curator of the Supreme Court. Yet the existence of these docket books was 
not widely known, and access to them was highly restricted. In April of 2014, however, the 
Court adopted new guidelines designed to increase access to the docket books for researchers. 
These docket books supply a wealth of information concerning the internal deliberations of the 
justices, much of which has been analyzed in detail elsewhere.2 This article considers what the 
docket books can teach us about the cases comprising what some have called the “switch-in-
time”: West Coast Hotel Co v Parrish,3 which upheld Washington State’s minimum wage law 
for women and overruled Adkins v Children’s Hospital;4 the Labor Board Cases,5 which upheld 
the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act;6 and the Social Security Cases,7 which 
upheld the constitutionality of provisions of the Social Security Act8 establishing an old-age 
pension system and a federal-state cooperative plan of unemployment insurance, as well as 
corresponding state unemployment compensation statutes. 
During the 1936 October Term, the Court’s personnel consisted of Chief Justice Hughes and 
Associate Justices Willis Van Devanter, James Clark McReynolds, Louis D. Brandeis, George 
Sutherland, Pierce Butler, Harlan Fiske Stone, Owen J. Roberts, and Benjamin N. Cardozo. For 
                                                          
2 See Barry Cushman, Vote Fluidity on the Hughes Court: The Critical Terms, 1934-1936, 2017 
U Ill L Rev 269 (2017); Barry Cushman, The Hughes Court Docket Books: The Late Terms, 
1937-1940, 55 Am J Leg Hist 361 (2015); Barry Cushman, The Hughes Court Docket Books: 
The Early Terms, 1929-1933, 40 J S Ct Hist 103 (2015). See also Barry Cushman, Inside the Taft 
Court: Lessons from the Docket Books, 2015 S Ct Rev 345 (2016). 
3 300 US 379 (1937). 
4 261 US 525 (1923) (invalidating District of Columbia’s minimum wage law for women). 
5 Associated Press v National Labor Relations Board, 301 US 103 (1937); NLRB v Friedman-
Harry Marks Clothing Co, 301 US 58 (1937); NLRB v Fruehauf Trailer Co, 301 US 49 (1937); 
NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp, 301 US 1 (1937). 
6 49 Stat 449 (1935). 
7 Helvering v Davis; 301 US. 619 (1937); Steward Machine Co v Davis, 301 US 548 (1937); 
Carmichael v Southern Coal & Coke Co, 301 US 495 (1937); Chamberlin v Andrews, 299 US 
515 (1936). 
8 49 Stat 620 (1935). 
3 
 
the 1936 Term, the Office of the Curator’s collection contains the docket books of five of these 
justices. Unfortunately, the docket books of Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Sutherland and 
Cardozo do not appear to have survived, and it seems that for the 1936 Term Justice 
McReynolds followed his regular practice of burning his docket book at the conclusion of each 
Term.9 Though Van Devanter’s docket book for the Term survives and contains entries for most 
of the cases decided by the Court that year, it contains no records of conference votes or 
conference discussion. As a consequence, it is of little use to the historical researcher. 
The collection does, however, contain the Term’s docket books kept by Justices Stone, 
Roberts, Brandeis, and Butler. The Stone docket book contains records of the conference votes in 
most cases, and occasionally some notes on the remarks made by colleagues during conference 
discussions. The Roberts docket book similarly contains records of the conference votes in most 
cases, along with an occasional but none-too-frequent note on conference discussions. Professor 
Paul Freund, who clerked for Justice Brandeis during the 1932 Term, reported that for most of 
his judicial career the Justice destroyed his docket books at the end of each Term.10 Brandeis 
discontinued this practice toward the end of his tenure, however, and as a result the Curator’s 
collection holds his docket book for the 1936 Term. Brandeis’s docket book contains records of 
the conference votes in most cases, along with occasional notes on conference discussions. 
Regrettably, in some instances the Justice’s notes on the conference discussion are obscured by a 
pasted-over, typed account of the ultimate disposition. 
                                                          
9 Dennis J. Hutchinson and David J. Garrow, eds, The Forgotten Memoir of John Knox 84 
(2002). The Office of the Curator does, however, contain McReynolds’s docket book from the 
1934 Term. It also houses Cardozo’s docket book from the 1932 Term. 
10 Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Professor Paul A. Freund: “A Colloquy,”' Proceedings 
of the Forty-Ninth Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit (May 24, 1989), 
reprinted in 124 FRD 241, 347 (1988). 
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The Curator’s collection also contains Justice Butler’s docket book for the 1936 Term. 
Butler’s docket book provides not only a record of conference votes, but also a remarkably rich 
set of notes on conference discussions. These notes corroborate numerous accounts of Hughes’s 
conduct of the Court’s conferences,11 at which the Chief Justice would begin with a masterful 
presentation of the facts and issues in each case and a statement of his own views of how those 
issues should be resolved. The justices next would present their own views in descending order 
of seniority, and finally would cast their votes in ascending order of seniority, with Hughes 
voting last. Butler’s notes therefore often consist principally of the Chief Justice’s remarks, 
which help to compensate for the fact that Hughes’s docket books and Court papers have not 
survived.12 
Considered in concert with information previously known, the data revealed by these four 
docket books shed considerable new light on the nature of the Court’s deliberations in each of 
these three sets of cases. Let us take up each of them in turn. 
I. The Minimum Wage Cases 
 
In the June, 1936 decision in New York ex rel. Morehead v Tipaldo, Justice Roberts voted 
with the Four Horsemen (Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Butler) to strike down 
New York’s minimum wage law for women. In the March, 1937 decision in West Coast Hotel 
                                                          
11 See, for example, the discussion and sources collected in William G. Ross, The Chief 
Justiceship of Charles Evans Hughes, 1930-1941 at 219–21 (2007). 
12 With the exception of the McReynolds OT 1934 Docket Book, which was donated to the 
Curator’s office in the 1990s by a descendant of a law clerk, each of these docket books 
remained in the Supreme Court building after the respective justice either retired or died while in 
office. It is not known why these volumes were retained, nor why not all of the sets of docket 
books are complete. In 1972 all of the “historic” docket books held in the Supreme Court 
building were boxed up by the Court’s Marshal at the order of Chief Justice Warren Burger, and 
were later transferred to the Curator’s Office. Email communication from Matthew Hofstedt, 
Associate Curator, Supreme Court of the United States, Aug 26, 2014. 
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Co v Parrish, by contrast, Roberts joined the four Tipaldo dissenters to uphold Washington 
State’s minimum wage law for women. This “switch” calls out for an explanation, and in 1945, 
the year of his retirement from the Court, Roberts supplied one at the request of Felix 
Frankfurter.13 Roberts explained in his 1945 memorandum that the New York Attorney General 
had not requested that the Court overrule Adkins v Children’s Hospital, but that in West Coast 
Hotel “the authority of Adkins was definitely assailed and the Court was asked to reconsider and 
overrule it.”14 For many, the take-away from the memorandum was that the fault for the result in 
Tipaldo lay not with the Court but instead with New York’s timorous lawyers.  
It was true that the New York Attorney General had not asked the justices to overrule Adkins. 
It also was true that in its opinion upholding the statute in West Coast Hotel, the Washington 
State Supreme Court had effectively declared that Adkins already had been overruled. As Chief 
Justice Hughes put it: “The state court has refused to regard the decision in the Adkins case as 
determinative and has pointed to our decisions both before and since that case as justifying its 
position.”15 It was true as well that counsel for the party challenging the Washington statute 
observed that “the issue before this Court is simply whether the Adkins case is to be reconsidered 
and reversed or whether its authority is to be sustained.”16 And because the Washington statute 
was substantially identical to the law struck down in Adkins, it is difficult to see how the Court 
could have affirmed the State court without overruling Adkins. But despite all of this, the fact 
that New York’s lawyers had not requested that Adkins be overruled was not particularly helpful 
                                                          
13 Frankfurter held the memorandum that Roberts produced at his request until Roberts’s death in 
1955, when he published it in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review. Felix Frankfurter, Mr. 
Justice Roberts, 104 U Pa L Rev 314, 314 (1955). 
14 Id. at 314–15. 
15 300 US at 389. 
16 Appellant’s Answer to Brief of Amicus Curiae, West Coast Hotel Co v Parrish, at 18. 
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to Roberts’s explanation. For there was no denying that neither the brief for the party defending 
the statute in West Coast Hotel, nor the amicus curiae brief filed by the attorneys for the state of 
Washington, had requested that Adkins be overruled.17 In that respect, the litigation posture of 
West Coast Hotel was no different from that in Tipaldo. 
Other evidence, however, suggests a different explanation. As I have noted, the Roberts 
memorandum is not without its difficulties, but some of the Justice’s recollections point toward 
the understanding ultimately articulated by his later confidante, Felix Frankfurter. Roberts 
reported that at the conference at which certiorari was granted in Tipaldo, he told his colleagues 
that he “saw no reason to grant the writ unless the Court were prepared to re-examine and 
overrule the Adkins case.”18 This suggests that it was not Roberts’s position that he would not 
confront the issue of Adkins’s continuing authority unless the State asked him to. This remark 
suggests instead that Roberts was prepared to consider the question of whether Adkins should be 
overruled, but that he would not join an opinion upholding the New York measure on the ground 
that it was distinguishable from the statute invalidated in Adkins. Roberts’s memorandum 
recounts that he stated at the conference following the argument in Tipaldo that he was 
“unwilling to put a decision” on the ground for which New York had contended, namely, that the 
two statutes could be meaningfully distinguished.19 But that was precisely the ground upon 
                                                          
17 See Brief for the Appellee, West Coast Hotel Co v Parrish; Brief of Amici Curiae, West Coast 
Hotel Co v Parrish. 
18 Frankfurter, 104 U Pa L Rev at 314 (cited in note 13). 
19 Id. In an interview with Merlo J. Pusey, Roberts recalled: “‘When the case came before the 
judicial conference, we discussed it thoroughly and decided simply to let the old precedent stand. 
New York had come down to the Court without challenging the old precedent, Adkins v 
Children’s Hospital. I thought that was a dishonest argument. I wasn’t going to vote…to indicate 
there was any distinction. I agreed to stand on what was done before.’” Quoted in Charles 
Leonard, A Search for a Judicial Philosophy 90 (1971). 
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which Hughes planted his flag.20  Hughes was famously averse to overruling precedents where 
he did not regard it as absolutely necessary, and he has been subject to criticism for the 
distinctions he sometimes fashioned in order to avoid such official disruptions to the Court’s 
doctrine.21 In his dissenting opinion in Tipaldo, Hughes insisted that the two statutes were 
distinguishable, and he therefore refused to entertain the question of whether Adkins should be 
overruled.22 And though Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo joined this opinion,23 Hughes declined to 
join them in Stone’s dissent calling for Adkins to be overruled.24 This caused Stone to complain 
that it was “‘a sad business to stand only on differences of the two statutes,”’ and that he “could 
not understand why ‘the Chief Justice felt it necessary to so limit his opinion.”’25 
                                                          
20 A line from Justice Sutherland’s majority opinion in Adkins had stated that “a statute requiring 
the employer…to pay the value of services rendered, even to pay with fair relation to the extent 
of the benefit obtained from the service, would be understandable.” 261 US at 559. The statute at 
issue in Adkins, by contrast, had “ignored” the “moral requirement implicit in every contract of 
employment, viz., that the amount to be paid and the service to be rendered shall bear to each 
other some relation of just equivalence.” Id at 558.  Benjamin Cohen had seized on that language 
in drafting the New York statute, which required that employers pay a “fair wage” based on “the 
fair and reasonable value of the service rendered,” and it was on this basis that the lawyers for 
New York had sought to distinguish Adkins. Though Hughes and the other dissenters found the 
distinction constitutionally significant, Sutherland and the other remaining members of the 
Adkins majority did not. See William Lasser, Benjamin V. Cohen: Architect of the New Deal 
154–56 (2002).  
21 Paul A. Freund, Charles Evans Hughes as Chief Justice, 81 Harv L Rev 4, 35 (1967); Samuel 
Hendel, Charles Evans Hughes and the Supreme Court 279 (1951); Alpheus Thomas Mason, 
Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law 796 (1956); F.D.G. Ribble, The Constitutional Doctrines 
of Chief Justice Hughes, 41 Colum L Rev 1190, 1210 (1941); Owen J. Roberts, The Court and 
the Constitution 18 (1951). Paul Freund once characterized a distinction drawn by Hughes as one 
that “could be remembered just long enough to be stated once.” Freund, 81 Harv L Rev at 35. 
22 298 US at 618–31 (Hughes, CJ, dissenting). 
23 Id at 631. 
24 Id at 631–36 (Stone, J, dissenting). 
25 Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law at 423 (cited in note 21) (quoting Stone to 
Frankfurter, June 3, 1936). 
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 Roberts was the author of the landmark due process decision in Nebbia v New York, 
which many observers believed had implicitly overruled Adkins.26 Commentators therefore 
expressed considerable surprise when he joined the Tipaldo majority,27 and a satisfied sense of 
resolution when he voted to uphold the Washington statute the following year.28 In a letter to 
Paul Freund written in 1953, Frankfurter explained the reason for the Tipaldo hiccup on the road 
from Nebbia to West Coast Hotel. “The fact is that Roberts did not switch. He was prepared in 
Tipaldo to make a majority overruling Adkins. He was not prepared to distinguish Adkins. 
Because there was no majority for overrruling Adkins he was in the majority in the Morehead 
                                                          
26 See Thomas C. Chapin, Stare Decisis and Minimum Wages, 9 U Colo L Rev 297, 306 (1937); 
Robert Hale, Minimum Wages and the Constitution, 36 Colum L Rev 629, 633 (1936); Morris 
Duane, Government Regulation of Prices in Competitive Business, 10 Temple L Rev 262, 264 
(1936); John E. Hannigan, Minimum Wage Legislation and Litigation, 16 BU L Rev 845, 865 
(1936); Hugh Willis, Constitutional Law of the United States 736 (1936); Recent Cases, 85 U Pa 
L Rev 109, 118 (1936); Thomas Raeburn White, Constitutional Protection of Liberty of 
Contract: Does It Still Exist?, 83 U Pa L Rev 425, 438, 440 (1935); Norman J. Macbeth, Jr, 
Note, Present Status of the Adkins Case, 24 Ky L J 59, 66 (1935); Note, Nebbia v People: A 
Milestone, 82 U Pa L Rev 619, 619, 622 (1934); Francis W. Matthys, Recent Decision, 9 Notre 
Dame L Rev 468, 470 (1934); Alpheus Thomas Mason, Labor, the Courts, and Section 7(a), 28 
Am Pol Sci Rev 999, 1007–08 (1934); Joseph H. Mueller, Note, Price Fixing, 23 Ill Bar J 89, 91 
(1934). See also Nebbia, 291 US at 555 (McReynolds, J, dissenting) (“The argument advanced 
here would support general prescription of prices for farm products, groceries, shoes, clothing, 
all the necessities of modern civilization, as well as labor, when some legislature finds and 
declares such action advisable and for the public good”). 
27 See Olin Browder, Jr, Note, Validity of New York Minimum Wage Law, 25 Ill Bar J 75, 76 
(1936); Louis H. Rubenstein, The Minimum Wage Law, 11 St John’s L Rev 78, 82–83 (1936); 
Comment, 34 Mich L Rev 1180, 1187 (1936). See also Tipaldo, 298 US at 635–36 (Stone, J, 
dissenting) (arguing that Nebbia “should control the present case,” is “irreconcilable with the 
decision and most that was said in the Adkins case,” and has “left the Court free of [Adkins's] 
restriction as a precedent. We should follow our decision in the Nebbia case”). 
28 See Kurt Stern, Note, Recent Interpretation by the Supreme Court of Liberty of Contract in 
Employment Cases, 11 U Cin L Rev 82, 89 (1937); Paul Y. Davis, The Washington Minimum 
Wage Decision, 12 Ind L J 415, 417 (1937); Chapin, 9 U Colo L Rev at 306 (cited in note 26); 
Browder, Jr, 25 Ill Bar J at 286 (cited in note 27); Note, Progress in the Minimum Wage 
Struggle, 22 Iowa L Rev 565, 570–71 (1937). 
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case. . . .”29 Two years later, in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Frankfurter 
announced publicly that “when the Tipaldo case was before the Court in the spring of 1936,” 
Roberts “was prepared to overrule the Adkins decision. Since a majority could not be had for 
overrruling it, he silently agreed with the Court in finding the New York statute under attack in 
the Tipaldo case not distinguishable from the statute which had been declared unconstitutional in 
the Adkins case.”30 In Frankfurter’s accounting, Roberts had not believed that the Court could 
legitimately sustain the New York statute unless a majority of the justices was prepared to 
overrule Adkins. Because there was not such a majority, he acquiesced in an opinion invalidating 
the statute on the authority of Adkins, just as Stone and Adkins dissenters Chief Justice William 
Howard Taft and Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and Edward Terry Sanford had in the 
1920s—even when state attorneys had specifically requested that the Court overrule Adkins.31 
                                                          
29 Felix Frankfurter to Paul Freund, microformed on Felix Frankfurter Papers, Harvard Law 
School Library, at Part III, Reel 15, quoted in Michael Ariens, A Thrice-Told Tale, or Felix the 
Cat, 107 Harv L Rev 620, 633 n 78 (1994). See also Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr, The Age of 
Roosevelt: The Politics of Upheaval 479 (1960) (“Prepared to reverse Adkins but not to 
distinguish it, Roberts felt that existing alternatives left him no choice but to vote with those who 
would strike down the New York law”); Thomas Reed Powell, Vagaries and Varieties in 
Constitutional Interpretation 81 n 89 (1956) (“Mr. Justice Roberts's position in the two cases can 
be harmonized as the view of one who was unable to distinguish the Adkins case but who would 
accept an opportunity to overrule it”). 
30 Frankfurter, 104 U Pa L Rev at 314 (cited in note 13). Freund apparently concurred in this 
interpretation. See Freund, 81 Harv L Rev at 29–30 (cited in note 21). 
31 See Donham v West-Nelson Mfg Co, 273 US 657 (1927) (Taft, Holmes, Sanford, and Stone 
all concurring silently in affirming per curiam a decision invalidating Arkansas minimum wage 
statute on authority of Adkins); Murphy v Sardell, 269 US 530 (1925) (Taft, Sanford, and Stone 
concurring silently in per curiam decision striking down Arizona’s minimum wage statute, and 
Holmes concurring only because he regarded himself as bound by the authority of Adkins). As 
Charles Curtis noted, “Roberts had done no more by joining with the ex-majority [in Tipaldo] 
than to follow [Adkins] as a precedent that was binding on him. No more, indeed, than Holmes 
himself had done, when he accepted Adkins in the two cases that had come up from Arizona and 
Arkansas shortly afterwards.” Charles Curtis, Lions Under the Throne: A Study of the Supreme 
Court 163–64 (1947). 
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 This explanation suggested that the reason for the outcome in Tipaldo rested not with the 
litigation strategy of the New York Attorney General, but instead with Hughes’s refusal to 
confront the question of whether Adkins should be overruled. When Hughes got his “shot at 
redemption”32 later that same year, however, he certainly made the most of it. Butler typically 
did not keep notes of remarks made during discussions concerning whether to grant certiorari or 
note probable jurisdiction, but when the justices met on October 10, 1936 to decide whether to 
hear West Coast Hotel, he did. The case came up on appeal rather than on certiorari, so the issue 
was whether to note probable jurisdiction. Appeals remained an area of the Court’s nominally 
mandatory jurisdiction, but a 1936 treatise on the Court’s jurisdiction that Hughes had 
commissioned two of his former clerks to prepare reminded its readers that the Court would not 
note probable jurisdiction unless the case presented a “substantial federal question.”33 The Court 
would reject a case where the federal question involved was “frivolous,” or where the question 
was “deemed to be foreclosed by well settled principles enunciated in prior decisions.”34 As 
then-Professor Frankfurter and James Landis had put it in an article published in 1930, counsel 
were obliged to “persuade the Court that the record presents an issue that is not frivolous and is 
not settled by prior decisions.”35  
                                                          
32 Jeff Shesol, Supreme Power: Franklin D. Roosevelt vs. The Supreme Court 415 (2011). 
33 Reynolds Robertson and Francis R. Kirkham, The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the 
United States 48 (1936). 
34 Id at 96. 
35 Felix Frankfurter and James M. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term, 
1929, 44 Harv L Rev 1, 12 (1930). The authors went on to observe, “[p]lainly the question of 
substantiality is neither rigid nor narrow. The play of discretion is inevitable . . . . To the extent 
that there are reasonable differences of opinion as to the solidity of a question presented for 
decision or the conclusiveness of prior rulings,” the question of substantiality “operates to 
subject the obligatory jurisdiction of the Court to discretionary considerations not unlike those 
governing certiorari.” Id at 12, 14.  See Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some 
Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges’ Bill, 100 Colum L Rev 1643, 1708 (2000). 
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This was the question with which the Court was faced at the conference on probable 
jurisdiction that October. The principles articulated in Adkins would have appeared to be well-
settled. They had been affirmed in per curiam decisions in 1925 and again in 1927,36 and had 
been vigorously championed by Butler’s majority opinion in Tipaldo only four months earlier. 
Yet Butler records Hughes as presenting the case to the conference with the statement, “This 
case is under Adkins rather than Tipaldo.”37 Tipaldo, he appeared to assert, did not actually settle 
the precise principles set out in Adkins, because the statutes involved in the two cases had 
differed materially. Nevertheless, those principles had been settled in Adkins and the two per 
curiam decisions handed down shortly thereafter, and if they were to be affirmed again, West 
Coast Hotel might have been handled by a simple summary reversal. But the Court instead noted 
probable jurisdiction and set the case down for briefing and argument.38 
At the December 19 conference after oral argument in West Coast Hotel, Hughes made 
clear why he had wanted to hear the case. Butler recorded the Chief as asking, “Can Adkins be 
distinguished.” Hughes maintained that the argument in favor of the statute “that [the] Hotel 
[was a public] utility etc. [was] not good.” It offered a “Possible but not satisfactory distinction” 
from Adkins. “Then” Hughes raised the question, “should Adkins be overruled.” He indicated 
that he “Agreed with Taft’s [dissenting] op[inion]” in Adkins. “J’s opn has more weight now.” 
Those challenging the statute had “not shown” that the “Reasonable value” of the employee’s 
labor was “less than [a] living wage.” In concluding his argument in favor of overruling Adkins, 
                                                          
36 See note 31. 
37 Butler OT 1936 Docket Book. Butler reports that Hughes “quoted words of the act.” Some of 
the words in the next sentence unfortunately are difficult to make out, but it appears to read, 




Hughes “Cited other instances of overruling.”39 Brandeis did not often take notes of remarks 
made during conference discussions, but on this occasion he wrote, “CJ thinks we should 
overrule Adkins Case.”40  
The public reaction to Tipaldo had been very unfavorable. Out of 344 newspaper 
editorials on the decision, only ten supported it. Some sixty of these publications, including some 
of the more conservative, called for a constitutional amendment to overturn it. Even Herbert 
Hoover stated in response to the decision that “something should be done to give back to the 
states the powers they thought they already had.” 41 The Republican Party’s 1936 campaign 
platform included a plank favoring minimum wages for women and children, and the Party’s 
presidential candidate, Alf Landon, endorsed such legislation in his telegram to the convention 
accepting the Party’s nomination.42 The public outcry following Tipaldo was simply of a 
different order than the criticism that had been leveled at the Court for earlier decisions 
invalidating New Deal measures. 
Though Frankfurter maintained that Roberts had been prepared in Tipaldo to face 
squarely the issue of whether Adkins should be overruled, some scholars have suggested that it 
was the strength of the public reaction to Tipaldo that prompted Roberts to take that step in West 
                                                          
39 Id. 
40 Brandeis OT 1936 Docket Book. Each of the available docket books records both Hughes and 
Roberts as voting to affirm at the December 19 conference. Butler OT 1936 Docket Book; 
Roberts OT 1936 Docket Book (“Hold for Stone”); Brandeis OT 1936 Docket Book (“Hold for 
Justice Stone”). Stone was absent from the conference on account of a lengthy illness, but his 
docket book also records the vote as 4-4 on December 19 (“12/19/36 Hold for Stone”), with 
Stone’s vote later entered by pencil. Stone OT 1936 Docket Book. The Roberts and Brandeis 
Docket Books show Stone returning to cast the deciding vote on February 6. 
41 Schlesinger, The Age of Roosevelt at 489 (cited in note 30). 
42 Kirk Porter and Donald Johnson, National Party Platforms, 1840-1972 at 367 (1973); Curtis, 
Lions Under the Throne at 154 (cited in note 31); Paul L. Murphy, The Constitution in Crisis 
Times, 1918-1969, at 151 & n 74 (1972). 
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Coast Hotel.43 The docket books do not enable us to evaluate that hypothesis with respect to 
Roberts, but they do with respect to Hughes. At the October 10 conference on whether to note 
probable jurisdiction in West Coast Hotel, Butler records Hughes as saying, “Public mind much 
disturbed – Campaign.”44 The reference to “Campaign” is a bit obscure, but it presumably refers 
to the fact that both of the major political parties were exercised about the issue and critical of 
the Tipaldo decision. But there can be no doubt that the mention of the “disturbed” state of the 
“public mind” refers to the response to Tipaldo. None of the docket books records Hughes as 
raising such considerations during the deliberations on the merits in West Coast Hotel, nor have I 
seen in any of the docket books records of this sort of consideration being raised in any other 
case. Indeed, in view of Hughes’s record in cases involving due process, it seems very likely that 
if he had confronted the question of whether Adkins should be overruled in the spring of 1936, he 
would have determined that it should. It did not take the reaction to Tipaldo to persuade Hughes 
that Adkins was wrong on the merits. But his remarks at the conference on probable jurisdiction 
suggest that that reaction may have played at least some role in his determination to confront the 
issue of Adkins’s continuing authority in West Coast Hotel.45 
In any event, the docket books reveal that, whereas in Tipaldo Hughes refused to confront 
the question of whether Adkins should be overruled, in West Coast Hotel Hughes took the lead in 
urging his colleagues to confront and overrule that precedent. This may help to resolve a 
difficulty with the account that attempts to shift the blame for Tipaldo to the New York attorney 
                                                          
43 Richard D. Friedman, Switching Time and Other Thought Experiments: The Hughes Court and 
Constitutional Transformation, 142 U Pa L Rev 1891, 1952 (1994); Edward A. Purcell, Jr, 
Rethinking Constitutional Change, 80 Va L Rev 277, 289–90 (1994); Merlo J. Pusey, Justice 
Roberts’ 1937 Turnaround, 1983 YB Sup Ct Hist Soc 102, 106. 
44 Butler OT 1936 Docket Book. 
45 Accord, Merlo J. Pusey, The Supreme Court Crisis 51 (1937). 
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general for failing to request that the Court overrule Adkins. Several commentators who question 
that account have rightly observed that in 1938 Roberts voted in Erie Railroad v Tompkins46 to 
overrule the nearly century-old precedent of Swift v Tyson47 even though neither of the parties 
had challenged the vitality of that decision.48 The docket book accounts in West Coast Hotel, 
however, suggest that Erie may support rather than impeach the claim that Roberts was 
consistent in these matters. For when Hughes presented Erie to the conference, he announced 
that, “If we wish to overrule Swift v Tyson, here is our opportunity.”49 Perhaps in part as a result 
of Hughes’s leadership—which may have been prompted by his experience in Tipaldo—a 
majority to overrule Swift was assembled. In Tipaldo, by contrast, Hughes played an isolated, 
idiosyncratic role in the deliberations and did not take the lead in confronting Adkins. As a result, 
no majority to overrule that decision could be assembled. But in West Coast Hotel, even though 
none of the litigants had requested that Adkins be overruled, Hughes played the kind of 
leadership role that he would in Erie. The explanation for Roberts’s “switch” in the minimum 
wage cases thus would appear to lie not in the litigation strategies of the parties, but instead in 
the conduct of the Chief Justice.50 
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II. The Labor Board Cases 
No less celebrated than West Coast Hotel were four sharply divided decisions in which the 
Court upheld the Government in cases testing the constitutionality of the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA): NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp,51 which upheld application of the 
Act to a large steel manufacturer; NLRB v Fruehauf Trailer Co,52 upholding application of the 
Act to a mid-sized company making trailers; NLRB v Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co,53 
upholding application of the Act to a small clothing manufacturer in Richmond, Virginia; and 
Associated Press v National Labor Relations Board,54 upholding the Act’s application to a major 
wire service notwithstanding the company’s First Amendment objections. Unfortunately, in all 
but the Associated Press case, the docket books are not very revealing about the conference 
deliberations. Brandeis did not record the vote in any of the cases.55 Stone and Roberts recorded 
only that each vote was 5-4, with the Four Horsemen dissenting.56 Butler recorded the vote in 
each case, as well as some remarks of Hughes concerning the Jones & Laughlin case. According 
to Butler’s notes, Hughes stated: “Extensive operations. Aliqippa Local not I.C. [interstate 
commerce] normally under control of state. Power ‘to protect’ against direct burden.”57 
Butler preserved lengthy notes on the conference discussion in Associated Press, however, 
presumably in part because it appears to have been the one of the Labor Board Cases in which 
                                                          
during the 1936 Term, see Cushman, 89 Notre Dame L Rev at 1984 (cited in note 1); Barry 
Cushman, The Man on the Flying Trapeze, 15 U Pa J Con Law 183, 235–37 (2012). 
51 301 US 1 (1937). 
52 301 US 49 (1937). 
53 301 US 58 (1937). 
54 301 US 103 (1937). 
55 Brandeis OT 1936 Docket Book. 
56 Stone OT 1936 Docket Book; Roberts OT 1936 Docket Book. 
57 Butler OT 1936 Docket Book. Butler mistakenly recorded Hughes as voting with the Four 
Horsemen in Fruehauf. 
16 
 
the justices considered whether the NLRA was facially invalid.58 After laying out some of the 
facts, Hughes posed the question, “Is it [the NLRA] void on its face?” In order to answer that 
question, he next “examined [the] Act,” noting that it covered labor disputes that “affect 
‘Commerce,’” which section 6 of the Act “defines classically.” “But for this”—determining 
whether a labor dispute was one “‘affecting com[merce]”—Hughes continued, “ct. is to say what 
is permissible.” This was because the statute “Refers to [the] constitutional range of power.” The 
question was, “Is each legitimate?” To be such, the effect of the dispute “must be so ‘immediate 
and direct’ as to affect com[merce].” The aim of the Act, Hughes observed, was to “Protect 
employ[ee]s in bargaining.” He then added that “‘agencies and instrumentalities’” of commerce 
“are like the principal.” Both were “interstate com[merce].” Thus, Hughes concluded, the Act 
was “not void on [its] face.”59 
Hughes next asked, “Is A.P. engaged in i.c. [interstate commerce]?” Here Hughes “Referred 
to cases on trans[portation] unions [illegible] intelligence.” He “Used illustration to show state 
law can not burden A.P. [pre]dominantly in i.c.” “Then (passing A.P.[’s] 5th Am. [objection]),” 
Butler noted parenthetically, Hughes took up the question of “Freedom of Press.” Here, he 
maintained, there was “no compulsion”—the requirement was “only to have representation.” 
“Membership [in a union] does[n’t] in itself interfere with freedom of Press,” Hughes argued. 
A.P.’s “Right of discharge must be saved except for membership.” Hughes therefore concluded 
that the Circuit Court’s decision upholding the Act should be affirmed.60 
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Van Devanter spoke next, and he voiced disagreement neither with Hughes’s analysis of the 
statute’s facial validity, nor with his Commerce Clause analysis of the Act as applied to the 
Associated Press (AP). Neither did he defend AP’s Fifth Amendment objections to the statute. 
Instead, he argued that the Circuit Court should be “Reverse[d] solely on [the] ground of 
interference with freedom of [the] press.” AP was in the business of “forming” and “shaping” the 
news, and in order to do so “impartially & fairly” it was under a “Duty” to have “unbiased 
employees.”  For this reason, Van Devanter argued, “A.P. can oppose unions.” McReynolds 
agreed that the “Freedom [of the] Press [argument was] good.” He also maintained that AP was 
“a partnership” and “can employ whom they please.” Finally, Sutherland agreed that “A.P. can 
follow any policy it please.”61 So far as Butler’s notes reveal, none of the Four Horsemen 
maintained that the AP was not engaged in interstate commerce. In the end, Sutherland’s dissent 
for his fellow Horsemen confined itself to the First Amendment issue, expressly without 
meaning “thereby to record our assent to all that has been said with regard to other questions in 
the case.”62 
Perhaps the most interesting fact that the docket books reveal about the conference on the 
Labor Board Cases is the date on which it took place. The cases were argued on February 9, 10, 
and 11—in the immediate wake of President Roosevelt’s February 5 announcement of his Court-
packing plan—and many scholars have contended that they were decided in the Government’s 
favor due to the pressure brought to bear by FDR’s proposal.63 In the ordinary course the Labor 
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Board Cases probably would have been discussed and voted on at the conference held on the 
Saturday following oral argument.64 In this instance, that would have been February 13, still in 
the early days the Plan’s life, when many of its proponents were most optimistic about its 
prospects for passage. The justices did meet for conference on February 13, and they voted on at 
least six cases, including Herndon v Lowry65 and Hartford Steam Boiler, Inspection, & Ins Co v 
Harrison.66 But they did not discuss the Labor Board Cases. Nor did they discuss those cases on 
the following Saturday, February 20. Indeed, it does not appear that the justices even met for 
conference on that day—the docket books contain no record for that date of any votes on or 
discussions of cases.67 Instead, the conference at which the discussion and vote on the Labor 
Board Cases took place was held on Saturday, February 27.68 
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The docket books do not disclose the reasons for the delay in the Court’s deliberations, but 
the two weeks between February 13 and February 27 witnessed important developments in the 
fortunes of the Court-packing plan. By February 13 there were already significant reasons to 
doubt that the President’s plan would be enacted by Congress. There was the nearly unanimous 
denunciation of the plan in the media.69 There was the deluge of mail and telegram traffic into 
congressional offices that ran heavily against the plan.70 There was the comparable flood of 
supportive correspondence addressed to the justices.71 There was the very public opposition of 
the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, Hatton Sumners of Texas.72 There was the 
passage by the House on February 10th of a previously-stalled judicial pension bill that 
opponents of the plan hoped would defuse the crisis by creating an attractive inducement to 
retirement for some of the elderly justices.73 There was the public opposition to the bill by every 
Republican member of the Senate, and by nearly twenty of their conservative Democratic 
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colleagues.74 And on February 13 came the announcement that liberal Democratic Senator 
Burton Wheeler of Montana would lead the fight in opposition to the President’s bill.75 
By February 13 Hughes and his colleagues were aware of two additional, highly salient 
pieces of information. First, they knew that the factual predicate for the President’s proposal was 
vulnerable to challenge. In his message to Congress, Roosevelt had charged that the Court was 
failing to deliver “full justice” because it was “forced by the sheer necessity of keeping up with 
its business to decline, without even an explanation, to hear 87 percent of the cases presented to 
it by private litigants.”76 The appointment of additional justices, Roosevelt contended, was 
necessary in order to relieve and eliminate this “congestion” on the Court’s calendar by 
“supplement[ing] the work of older judges and accelerat[ing] the work of the court.”77 Brandeis, 
who as the Court’s sole octogenarian was deeply offended by Roosevelt’s claim that he and his 
elderly colleagues had been failing to discharge their duties with alacrity, later suggested to 
Wheeler that he solicit a letter from the Chief Justice answering the President’s allegations. 
Hughes agreed to Wheeler’s request,78 and Wheeler read Hughes’s letter to great effect when the 
opponents of the bill opened their testimony at the hearings before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee on March 22.  
Hughes’s letter reported that the Court was “fully abreast of its work,” that there was “no 
congestion of cases upon our calendar,” and that in fact “[t]his gratifying condition has obtained 
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for several years. We have been able for several Terms to adjourn after disposing of all cases 
which are ready to be heard.”79 Responding to the charge that the justices had declined to grant 
meritorious petitions for certiorari, Hughes insisted that the contrary was the case. The Court 
had been, if anything, too liberal in accepting cases for review. Indeed, many of the petitions 
denied had been so wholly lacking in merit that they ought never to have been presented for 
consideration.80 Moreover, Hughes observed, an “increase in the number of Justices of the 
Supreme Court…would not promote the efficiency of the Court.” Indeed, the Chief Justice 
maintained that “it would impair that efficiency so long as the Court acts as a unit. There would 
be more judges to hear, more judges to confer, more judges to discuss, more judges to be 
convinced and to decide. The present number of Justices is thought to be large enough so far as 
the prompt, adequate, and efficient conduct of the work of the Court is concerned.”81 
Robert Jackson later remarked that Hughes’s letter “did more than any one thing to turn the 
tide in the Court struggle.”82 Shortly after Wheeler had read the letter before the Judiciary 
Committee, Vice-President John Nance Garner telephoned FDR at Warm Springs to tell him, 
“We’re licked.”83 Though Hughes and his brethren could not be certain that they would have the 
opportunity to refute Roosevelt’s charges in a public forum, they must have anticipated early on 
the both the possibility and the likely effect. 
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The second salient fact about which the justices had inside information by February 13 was 
the result in the pending minimum-wage case of West Coast Hotel Co v Parrish. They knew that 
Hughes and Roberts had joined Brandeis and Cardozo in voting to uphold the law at the 
conference on December 19, and they knew that the ailing Stone, as expected, had returned to 
cast the deciding vote in favor of the statute at the conference on February 6.84 In short, they 
already knew that the “self-inflicted wound”85 of Tipaldo, which had so “disturbed’ the “public 
mind,” would soon be healed. Hughes also knew that he could control the timing of the 
decision’s announcement. In fact, the Chief Justice delayed the delivery of the opinion for 
several weeks in order to avoid conveying the false impression that the Court had reversed 
course on the minimum-wage issue in response to the Court-packing plan. He therefore held the 
opinion until the propitious date of March 29—exactly one week after Wheeler’s dramatic 
reading of Hughes’s letter at the Judiciary Committee hearings.86 
Here again, the impact was significant. “[I]t was obvious,” surmises Leonard Baker, “that the 
decision upholding the minimum wage would make it more difficult to push FDR’s Court plan 
through the Senate.”87 “Particularly after the Roberts switch, there was no nationwide desire for 
altering the Court, and as a result, no great desire in Congress either.”88 James MacGregor Burns 
concluded that “[b]y April, the chances for the Court plan were almost nil.”89 The justices 
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certainly could have anticipated this public and congressional response to West Coast Hotel, and 
they knew the outcome of that decision long before they met to discuss the Labor Board Cases. 
But if the justices knew all of this by February 13, they had the opportunity to learn much 
more about the Court-packing plan’s fortunes over the course of the two weeks following. 
Wheeler was able to recruit other liberal and progressive colleagues such as Gerald Nye and 
Lynn Frazier of North Dakota and Henrik Shipstead of Minnesota to the opposition.90 By the 
middle of the month regular Democrats Joseph C. O’Mahoney of Wyoming and Tom Connally 
of Texas had added their names to the ranks of the plan’s opponents.91 Many other Democratic 
senators remained conspicuously noncommittal.92 Soon a group of eighteen Democratic senators 
opposed to the plan met for dinner at the home of Maryland Democrat Millard Tydings for the 
purpose of forming a steering committee to lead the opposition.93 By February 15, Roosevelt’s 
Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morganthau gave the plan only a 50-50 chance of passage.94 
Within a few days another ominous signal would emerge. The Administration had planned to 
introduce the bill in the House, whose members were more dependent upon presidential favor 
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owing to the necessity of standing for election every two years.95 But Chairman Sumners had 
lined up a comfortable majority of the House Judiciary Committee in opposition to the bill, 
which meant that he could “keep the bill bottled up in his committee all summer.”96 The bill 
could be dislodged and brought to the floor only by a discharge petition signed by 218 members, 
or by suspension of the House Rules, which would require the support of two-thirds of the 
members.97 Such strong-arm tactics appealed neither to Majority Leader Sam Rayburn, nor to 
Speaker William Bankhead,98 who was already angry with the President for having excluded him 
from the discussions in which the Court-packing plan had been devised.99 Both of these 
Democratic leaders believed that such tactics would seriously impair and possibly destroy the 
bill’s chances of passage by the Senate, and would produce so much ill will in the House that the 
bill’s enactment by that body would be unlikely even if the measure survived the Senate gauntlet. 
After strenuous efforts at persuasion they ultimately prevailed upon Roosevelt to introduce the 
bill first in the Senate. The formal announcement of this decision came on February 18.100 And 
as everyone recognized, even were the bill to survive the Senate, upon its return to the House it 
would still face the same obstacles that concerned Bankhead and Rayburn.  
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Meanwhile, congressional Democrats seeking some sort of compromise proposal found the 
President intransigent on every front.101 On February 20th, for example, a delegation headed by 
Vice-President John Nance Garner, Senate Majority Leader Joseph Robinson, and Senate 
Judiciary Committee Chairman Henry Fountain Ashurst urged Roosevelt to agree to a 
compromise measure involving the addition to the Court of only two or three justices, rather than 
the six contemplated by the President’s proposal. FDR responded to this entreaty by “laugh[ing] 
in their faces.”102 This refusal to compromise, which was manifested very early in the struggle 
and persisted into June, was not unfounded in reason. For as internal Justice Department 
documents reveal, Roosevelt and others were well aware that any plan promising fewer than six 
additional appointments would not have achieved the objective of a “dependable” Court that 
could be relied upon to uphold New Deal legislation. A compromise on the number of additional 
justices simply was not in the cards.103 
By late February the relentless, highly organized, and well-informed lobbying efforts of the 
opposition senators104 had given them ever greater reason for confidence. On February 26, 
Senator Arthur Capper of Kansas wrote to William Allen White, “I think the Roosevelt program 
in its present form is blocked. I feel quite certain that we have enough votes to upset him.”105 
Leonard Baker reports that in late February, an agent of the opposition informed Chief Justice 
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Hughes that thirty-seven senators were “hostile” to the bill and twenty more were “doubtful.”106  
Under the Senate Rules in force at the time, only thirty-three votes were necessary to prevent 
cloture of floor debate.107 The opposition had begun by this time to formulate plans for a 
filibuster of the bill,108 and Hughes was informed that they had the votes necessary to sustain it. 
At about the same time a Democratic member of the opposition informed Idaho Republican 
Senator William Borah—who was a leader in the movement to filibuster the bill as well as an old 
friend of Van Devanter’s who helped to orchestrate the Justice’s May 18 retirement 
announcement—that there were forty-two senators opposed to the President’s plan.109 As a 
prominent Republican wrote not long after the Court’s conference on the Labor Board Cases, 
“unless there is a change of attitude caused by the tremendous propaganda of the Administration, 
there are enough senators pledged to speak against the President’s proposal to prevent a vote 
upon it.”110 
To be sure, there were those—including most conspicuously Roosevelt himself—who 
continued in the face of these developments to believe that the bill ultimately would achieve 
passage. Moreover, we do not know how many of the justices were made aware of this 
information, nor to what extent, if at all, it may have influenced their deliberations. But the 
postponement of the conference on the Labor Board Cases to February 27 certainly made it 
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possible for the justices to learn things about the political landscape confronting the Court-
packing plan that they could not have known had they taken the cases up at conference only two 
weeks earlier. 
III. The Social Security Cases 
The first of the Social Security Cases to reach the Court was Chamberlin v Andrews,111 
which concerned the constitutionality of New York State’s unemployment compensation statute. 
That act imposed a flat tax of three percent on the payrolls of all industrial enterprises employing 
four or more persons, with the proceeds held by a common fund for the relief of the unemployed. 
Chamberlin alleged that the tax was for the private purpose of benefiting a particular class rather 
than for a public purpose, and that it violated due process and denied equal protection because it 
required employers who had not laid off any of their employees “to contribute to a fund to help 
those who have lost positions in failing or bankrupt businesses.”112 A divided New York Court 
of Appeals had held that the tax was imposed for the legitimate public purpose of relieving 
unemployment, and that the classification was reasonable and not arbitrary.113 
 Hughes presented the case to the conference on November 21. He noted that the “Reply 
brief admits unemployment a matter of public concern. Means this fund for a public purpose—
Separate ‘fund’ not uncon. feature. Has element of ‘relief’. Need not consider whether it will 
‘prevent’ unemployment. [New York] C[ourt] of A[ppeals] calls it a ‘tax’ – But says whether is 
not a tax or a police power tax is not controlling. I think it a ‘tax.’” Having concluded that the tax 
was for a public purpose, Hughes next turned to the question of equal protection, asking, “May 
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employers be singled out to bear whole burden – little discretion – Is it ‘clear & hostile.’” He 
then ran through a list of hypothetical taxes that might single out certain elements of the 
population to bear their burdens. “Might all be put on real estate.” “Could be income tax alone – 
Occupation tax – Production tax -- if in Okla on oil.” Hughes then noted that “this is not a tax on 
property,” but instead on “payrolls.” At this point he invoked the authority of “Mountain 
Timber” Co v State of Washington.114 That decision had upheld a state workmen’s compensation 
statute that grouped industries into classes based upon the hazardousness of their work, and 
required employers in each such class to pay a flat percentage of their payrolls into a fund to be 
used to compensate employees in that class suffering workplace injuries. Hughes continued, 
observing that there was “no ‘clear and hostile’ discrimination” involved in the “Flat tax” “On 
employers.” The state “Could do that for any purpose.” Finally, the Chief Justice addressed the 
issue of the tax’s “flat rate without regard to hazard.” He noted that the “Difficulties to classify 
intersese” had been “emphasized,” and concluded that a “Means test [was] not necessary its 
allowance is small.”115 
 Van Devanter and McReynolds had dissented without opinion in Mountain Timber,116 so 
it was not surprising that they took a different view. Van Devanter argued that New York’s 
unemployment compensation law was “In respect of beneficiaries arbitrary” and “Unequal,” and 
McReynolds indicated his agreement with this assessment. Sutherland added that he believed 
that the law was “bad because of flat rate on all.” Brandeis conceded that the New York law was 
a “bad act,” but insisted that it was “within power.” He observed that the “Wisconsin act [was] 
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much better.”117 That act also created a common unemployment compensation fund, but 
established within it individual reserve accounts for each employer. Employers were required to 
pay into the fund only if they did not maintain their employment rolls intact, and then only to the 
extent that they laid off their employees. Moreover, the funds in each account were to be used 
only to compensate that employer’s own former employees.118 Brandeis’s expression of his 
admiration for the Wisconsin act was no mere random display of erudition. The statute had been 
drafted by his son-in-law, Paul Raushenbush, and was based on a memorandum that Brandeis 
himself had prepared in 1911.119 
The conference vote in Chamberlin was evenly divided at 4-4, with the Four Horsemen 
opposing Hughes, Brandeis, Roberts, and Cardozo. The ailing Stone was absent from the 
conference, however,120 so the decision of the New York Court of Appeals upholding the statute 
was affirmed by an equally divided Court.121 It would not be long, however, before a full Court 
would hear and decide Carmichael v Southern Coal & Coke Co,122 which considered the 
question of the constitutionality of Alabama’s unemployment compensation act. The Alabama 
statute was substantially similar to New York’s, and as the vote in Chamberlin had anticipated, 
the Court sustained it by a vote of 5-4. The April 17th conference vote was the same.123 In his 
presentation to his colleagues, Hughes noted that the Alabama statute was “like [the] N.Y. Act” 
upheld in Chamberlin. It was “not essentially dif[ferent].” The Chief’s presentation of the case 
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largely recounted the decision of the Alabama Supreme Court, but he appeared to agree with that 
court that the excise was for a “public purpose.” Van Devanter agreed that the excise was for a 
“public purpose,” but argued that it was “clearly arbitrary” and denied due process and equal 
protection “because” it provided “no classification” among employers. Instead, it simply created 
a “Hodge podge.”124 Butler records no further conference remarks, but Brandeis may again have 
mentioned the Wisconsin act. For Sutherland’s dissenting opinion for himself, Van Devanter, 
and Butler, while echoing the due process and equal protection objections to the Alabama act’s 
pooling feature that Van Devanter had raised at conference, praised the Wisconsin statute as “so 
fair, reasonable and just as to make plain its constitutional validity.”125 
Steward Machine Co v Davis126 upheld Title IX of the Social Security Act, which 
imposed a federal payroll tax on employers, payable to the U.S. Treasury, and then provided a 
credit of up to 90% against the tax for moneys paid into a qualifying state unemployment 
compensation fund.127 The statute’s tax-and credit scheme emulated a comparable arrangement 
that the Court had sustained unanimously in the 1927 decision of Florida v Mellon.128 There 
Congress had provided a credit against the federal estate tax for inheritance taxes paid to the 
decedent’s state government. In 1933 Brandeis had suggested to his son-in-law, Paul 
Raushenbush, that a federal-state cooperative unemployment insurance program could be 
structured in the same way. Just as the credit for state death taxes left the states free to enact such 
taxes without fear of disadvantaging their residents, so the credit against the federal tax imposed 
by the Social Security Act might encourage states to establish programs of unemployment 
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insurance without fear of placing their employers at a competitive disadvantage with employers 
in other states.129 
At the conference following oral argument in Steward Machine, the vote to uphold the 
statute was 5-2, with McReynolds and Butler dissenting and Van Devanter and Sutherland 
passing.130 Butler records Hughes as opening the conference by asking, “What is quality of 
exaction is it a tax – permitted by const.? – coercing states or territories in its control. Proceeds 
not earmarked may be used for any pub[lic] purpose.”  The value of Brandeis’s insightful 
counsel was confirmed when Hughes continued, “90% cr sustained by Fla v. Mellon – may be 
225,000,000 = After the credit $22,000,000 will remain – Power not affected by credit. Fits like 
a glove. ‘Mere fact of credit’ does not detract.” Hughes next asked, “Is this ‘tax & credit’ an 
invasion of state authority. State loses unless it pays.” Here again the Chief’s answer was simple: 
“Fla v. Mellon.”131 
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Hughes then turned to the recent precedent of United States v Butler,132 in which the 
Court had invalidated the 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act’s (AAA)133 use of the fiscal powers 
to induce farmers to reduce their output. That Act had imposed an excise on the processors of 
agricultural commodities, the proceeds of which were dedicated to benefit payments made to 
individual farmers who contracted with the federal government to curtail their production of 
specified commodities. The receiver of an insolvent textile mill successfully challenged the 
excise, with the Court holding by a vote of 6-3 that the exaction was invalid because the revenue 
it generated was devoted to effectuating a federal program regulating agricultural production and 
thereby intruding on the legislative domains of the States.   
Many scholars have argued that Steward Machine and Helvering v Davis implicitly 
repudiated Butler,134 but the Chief Justice and his colleagues did not see it that way. In the 
“Butler Case,” Hughes observed, “AAA individuals induced to make contracts. Majority thought 
coercive.” But here, he argued, “The state has agreed. It is sovereign & can agree = state is 
helped.” At this point in his notes Justice Butler interjected his own thoughts in brackets: “[But 
may state agree vs. power to deal with matters reserved to states?]” Butler’s record of Hughes’s 
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remarks concludes with what appears to be another question: “are particular conditions fair offer 
of cooperation.”135 
It was Van Devanter’s turn to speak next, but the most senior Associate Justice kept his 
own counsel and passed. McReynolds similarly withheld his views. Brandeis next stated that 
“This legislation is opposite to invasion of state power.” The last justice on whose remarks 
Butler took notes was Sutherland, whom he records as saying that he “Agrees with most of 1 
[Hughes]. State is free.” For this proposition Sutherland relied on a bit of his own handiwork, 
“Mass v. Mellon.”136 In the 1923 case of Massachusetts v Mellon,137 Sutherland had written for a 
unanimous Court upholding the Sheppard-Towner Maternity Act of 1921.138 That Act created a 
federal grant-in-aid program under which Congress appropriated funds to be disbursed to states 
that established qualifying programs for the promotion of maternal and infant health. 
Massachusetts had contended “that the statute constitutes an attempt to legislate outside the 
powers granted to Congress by the Constitution and within the field of local powers exclusively 
reserved to the states”; “that the ulterior purpose of Congress thereby was to induce the states to 
yield a portion of their sovereign rights”; and that “there is imposed upon the states an illegal and 
unconstitutional option either to yield to the federal government a part of their reserved rights or 
lose their share of the moneys appropriated.”139 Sutherland had answered that “the powers of the 
state are not invaded, since the statute imposes no obligation but simply extends an option which 
the state is free to accept or reject.”140 “Nor does the statute require the states to do or to yield 
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anything. If Congress enacted it with the ulterior purpose of tempting them to yield, that purpose 
may be effectively frustrated by the simple expedient of not yielding.”141 Yet Sutherland 
concluded his discussion of Steward Machine with remarks suggesting that he remained troubled 
by at least one of the Act’s features: “Am not sure does not invade power. State may not 
surrender or give US any part of its sovereignty.”142 
Cardozo’s opinion for the majority largely tracked the presentation that Hughes had made 
at conference. The tax was a valid excise,143 and the excise in combination with the credit was 
“not void as involving the coercion of the States in contravention of the Tenth Amendment or of 
restrictions implicit in our federal form of government.”144 Indeed, the state of Alabama did not 
“offer a suggestion that in passing the unemployment law she was affected by duress. For all that 
appears she is satisfied with her choice, and would be sorely disappointed if it were now to be 
annulled.”145 Cardozo explained that “Florida v. Mellon supplies us with a precedent, if 
precedent be needed,”146 and in the same paragraph he also cited Massachusetts v Mellon as a 
supportive decision.147 The majority concluded that the statute did “not call for a surrender by 
the states of powers essential to their quasi-sovereign existence.”148 
Cardozo distinguished Butler on four grounds. First, unlike the processing tax imposed 
by the AAA, which the Butler majority had held was not a true tax, the proceeds of the payroll 
tax were not “earmarked for a special group.” Second, unlike the AAA’s regulation of 
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agricultural production without the consent of the state in which it was conducted, “[t]he 
unemployment compensation law which is a condition of the credit has had the approval of the 
state and could not be a law without it.” Third, the state under the Social Security Act, unlike the 
farmer under the AAA, was not bound to “an irrevocable agreement, for the state at its pleasure 
may repeal its unemployment law, terminate the credit, and place itself where it was before the 
credit was accepted.” And fourth, unlike the “coercive contracts” under the AAA, which the 
Butler majority had held were “unlawful in their aim and oppressive in their consequences,” the 
condition of the tax credit available under the Social Security Act was “not directed to the 
attainment of an unlawful end, but to an end, the relief of unemployment, for which nation and 
state may lawfully cooperate.”149 
As they had at conference, McReynolds and Butler dissented. In an opinion consisting 
principally of quotations from President Franklin Pierce’s 1854 message vetoing a congressional 
bill granting lands to the states for the support of the indigent insane,150 McReynolds insisted that 
the challenged portion of the Act “unduly interferes with the orderly government of the State by 
her own people and otherwise offends the Federal Constitution.”151 Butler similarly objected that 
“in principle and as applied to bring about and to gain control over state unemployment 
compensation, the statutory scheme is repugnant to the Tenth Amendment.”152  
The Constitution grants to the United States no power to pay unemployed persons or to require 
the states to enact laws or to raise or disburse money for that purpose. The provisions in 
question, if not amounting to coercion in a legal sense, are manifestly designed and intended 
directly to affect state action in the respects specified. And, if valid as so employed, this ‘tax and 
credit’ device may be made effective to enable federal authorities to induce, if not indeed to 
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compel, state enactments for any purpose within the realm of state power and generally to 
control state administration of state laws.153 
“The terms of the measure make it clear,” Butler concluded, “that the tax and credit device was 
intended to enable federal officers virtually to control the exertion of powers of the states in a 
field in which they alone have jurisdiction and from which the United States is by the 
Constitution excluded.”154 
Sutherland’s separate dissenting opinion, in which he was joined by Van Devanter, 
faithfully reprised the comments he had made at conference. “With most of what is said in the 
opinion just handed down,” wrote the author of Massachusetts v Mellon and Florida v Mellon, “I 
concur.”155 
I agree that the pay roll tax levied is an excise within the power of Congress; that the devotion 
of not more than 90 per cent. of it to the credit of employers in states which require the payment 
of a similar tax under so-called unemployment-tax laws is not an unconstitutional use of the 
proceeds of the federal tax; that the provision making the adoption by the state of an 
unemployment law of a specified character a condition precedent to the credit of the tax does not 
render the law invalid. I agree that the states are not coerced by the federal legislation into 
adopting unemployment legislation. The provisions of the federal law may operate to induce the 
state to pass an employment law if it regards such action to be in its interest. But that is not 
coercion. If the act stopped here, I should accept the conclusion of the court that the legislation is 
not unconstitutional.156 
 
But as he had signaled at the conference, he could not overcome his doubts about the Act’s 
provision requiring payment of the proceeds of state taxes into the federal treasury, to be 
withdrawn only for unemployment compensation payments made through state agencies 
approved by a federal board.157 These “administrative provisions of the act,” Sutherland 
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maintained, “invade the governmental administrative powers of the several states reserved by the 
Tenth Amendment.”158 Therefore, he concluded, “the congressional act contemplates a surrender 
by the state to the federal government” of “state governmental power to administer its own 
unemployment law” and “the state payroll-tax funds which it has collected for the purposes of 
that law.”159 
 The last of the Social Security Cases was Helvering v Davis,160 which challenged the 
old-age pension provisions of the statute. Title VIII of the statute imposed payroll taxes on 
employers and employees; Title II made provision for the payment of Old Age Benefits. As with 
the taxes imposed by Title IX of the Act, the taxes imposed by Title VIII were paid directly into 
the Treasury, and were “not earmarked in any way.”161  Title II created an account in the 
Treasury to be known as the “Old-Age Reserve Account” from which future Old Age Benefits 
were to be paid, but the Act made no appropriation to fund that account. A shareholder of a 
Massachusetts corporation brought suit to restrain the company from paying the taxes and 
making the payroll deductions required by the Act. The company indicated that it intended to 
comply with the Act’s requirements unless it were restrained by an injunction. The 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue intervened, and argued that the shareholder had no standing 
to challenge the validity of the Act’s tax on employees. The District Court agreed that the tax on 
employees was not properly at issue, and upheld the tax on employers. The First Circuit, 
however, held that Title II constituted an invasion of powers reserved to the States by the Tenth 
Amendment, and that the invalidity of the expenditures to be made under Title II was fatal to the 
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taxes imposed by Title VIII. On certiorari, the Government waived its defense that the legal 
remedy was adequate, so as to bring the case within equity and secure a ruling on the merits.162  
The threshold question for the Court was whether there was jurisdiction in equity to 
entertain the suit for an injunction. Cardozo’s opinion for the majority questioned whether the 
directors had violated any duty by resolving to pay the taxes, and also whether the shareholder 
had “standing to challenge that resolve in the absence of an adequate showing of irreparable 
injury.” The question was further complicated, Cardozo suggested, by “the acquiescence of the 
company in the equitable remedy” imposed below, and by the Government’s waiver of its 
defense to equitable jurisdiction. Cardozo concluded that “in a controversy such as this a court 
must refuse to give equitable relief when a cause of action in equity is neither pleaded nor 
proved,” and therefore that the shareholder’s suit for an injunction “should be dismissed upon 
that ground.” Brandeis, Stone, and Roberts agreed with this position, but a majority of their 
colleagues “reached a different conclusion,” apparently because the company and the 
Government had not challenged the equitable remedy “at every stage of the proceeding.”163  
This division over the jurisdictional issue had been at the center of the conference 
discussion. Indeed, from Butler’s notes it appears that Brandeis, Stone, and Roberts spoke only 
to the issue of jurisdiction in equity. Brandeis remarked that he “Can’t see the propriety of 
passing on quest[ion]” of the Act’s “validity” in this case. “Our obligation,” he concluded, “is 
not to.”  Stone added that he “doubts Jur[isdiction] – parties can’t by waiver give Jur[isdiction] – 
must be finding that directors have not violated their duty. Not ‘entirely clear’ as to compelling. 
Can’t get to this [illegible].” Roberts is recorded only as agreeing with Brandeis and Stone that 
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there was “no Jur[isdiction].” Cardozo added that there was “no cause of action – Directors have 
no[t] exceeded power as the Company owes tax – US indemnifies Co for tax on employers.”164 
The vote on the question of jurisdiction was 5-4, with Hughes and the Four Horsemen 
prepared to decide the merits.165 Among those in the majority on the jurisdictional question, only 
Hughes appears to have spoken to the issue at conference. As to the “Standing of Davis to sue,” 
Hughes noted that “Both [parties] say there can be waiver [of the defense of an adequate remedy 
at law] and was,” citing “Pollock Case.” The reference was to Pollock v Farmer’s Loan & Trust 
Co,166 where the Court held that it had jurisdiction to entertain a suit in equity where the 
defendant had waived the defense of adequate remedy at law.167 The Davis case was “Clearly 
analogous,” Hughes argued. The Chief Justice invoked his own opinion in “Henrietta Mills [v. 
Rutherford] 281 [U.S. 121 (1930)],” which had held that the Court was without equitable 
jurisdiction to entertain a suit to enjoin collection of a state tax because the complaining party 
had an adequate remedy at law. In the final paragraph of that opinion, Hughes had written that 
“unless the case is one where the objection [that the plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law] 
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may be treated as waived by the party entitled to raise it, the prohibition is not to be 
disregarded. There was no waiver in the present case, and, as the petitioner had an adequate 
remedy at law, the district court could not properly entertain the suit.”168 Henrietta Mills, Hughes 
maintained in the Davis conference, “held remedy at law qu[estion] is wh[ether] equity is 
needed? Can def[initely] by waiver compel court to go on in equity. One ‘variant.’”  Hughes 
focused on the “wages of employees,” noting that an “employee in Mass[achusetts] can compel 
full payment of wages,” as there was “No plain clear adequate rem[edy] at law as to wages.” 
Hughes urged that the Court “Should not overrule” Pollock and Henrietta Mills on this point, and 
should hold that the Court had “jurisdiction” “in equity.”169 
On the merits, the Court upheld the tax on employers and the provisions of Title II by a 
vote of 7-2, with only McReynolds and Butler noting dissents. Cardozo’s opinion held that the 
provisions of Title II were expenditures in aid of the general welfare, and that there was therefore 
“no occasion to inquire whether Title VIII would have to fall if Title II were set at naught.”170 
The vote on the merits had been the same at conference.171 After discussing the jurisdictional 
question, Hughes began by pointing out that Title VIII imposed its tax on “all employers” rather 
than only on those having a certain number of employees, making the question of its 
constitutionality “easier [than Section] 901,” the taxing provision of Title IX upheld in Steward 
Machine. The “Only possible question” was thus the “‘way in wh[ich] [the tax was] laid’ – 
purpose for which laid.” “As to [the] purpose,” it was for “old age benefits.”  There were “No 
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provisions for using [the proceeds of the tax imposed by] Title VIII for [payment of the benefits 
payable under] Title II.”  The proceeds of the tax were “no[t] earmarked,” and it would be 
“Extraordinary to draw inferences for supposed relation.” Title VIII imposed a “mere excise on 
payroll.”172 
Van Devanter then followed, saying that he was “Not sure [whether] Title II & Title VIII 
[were] not so distinct” as Hughes had made them out to be, but that he believed that the “Tax 
[was] valid.” McReynolds indicated his preference to affirm the First Circuit, and Brandeis is 
recorded as speaking only to the jurisdictional issue. Sutherland spoke next, agreeing with 
Hughes that the tax was a valid excise. The “Tax and purpose,” he observed, “appear on face of 
act.” He disagreed with Hughes’s effort to dissociate Titles VIII and II, maintaining that “They 
are tied in as in Butler.” But that was of no consequence, because here, unlike in Butler, the 
“purpose is within power Congress.” These Titles were “free from [the] object[ions] in other 
cases” like Steward Machine, because here there was “no interfere[nce] with [the] power of the 
state. Congress,” he concluded, “can ‘appropriate’ for the old.”  Justice Butler then signaled his 
view that the Circuit Court should be affirmed, after which Stone and Roberts spoke only to the 
jurisdictional question. Cardozo then took up the jurisdictional question as well, but added that 
“On [the] merits” he was “with 1 [Hughes]” and “also [with] 5 [Sutherland].”173 
One feature of this exchange is worthy of brief remark. After Hughes, Van Devanter, and 
Sutherland had spoken, it would have been clear to Stone, Roberts, and Cardozo—all of whom 
had been in the Steward Machine majority—that if the Court were to reach the merits, there 
would be a majority to uphold the Act. It would have been a simple matter for them to voice 
                                                          




agreement with Hughes and Sutherland on the both the jurisdictional issue and the merits. Yet 
Butler records both Stone and Roberts, like Brandeis, as saying only that the case should be 
dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, and Cardozo stood with them on this point both at 
conference and in his opinion for the Court. Even when they were faced with the question of the 
constitutional validity of a massive new social program in the midst of a “constitutional crisis,” 
Butler’s conference notes depict these men as conscientiously focused on the particular features 
of the specific litigation before them, and as thinking and speaking about that litigation in very 
professional, lawyerly terms.174 
Finally, it bears emphasis that Butler’s notes of the conferences on Steward Machine and 
Davis reinforce what was said in the published opinions: that the justices in the majority did not 
believe that they were in any way retreating from the positions that they had taken in United 
States v Butler. In Steward Machine, Hughes and Sutherland agreed that, unlike the farmers who 
had entered into acreage reduction contracts under the AAA, the states enacting qualifying 
programs of unemployment compensation had acted freely and were not coerced. In Davis, 
Hughes saw the fact that the proceeds of the payroll tax were not earmarked as distinguishing the 
Social Security Act from the AAA. And both Hughes and Van Devanter appear to have agreed 
with Sutherland that the benefit payments authorized by Title II, unlike those made under the 
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AAA, were for a public purpose within the power of Congress. Where others have seen a new 
doctrinal departure, these justices saw doctrinal continuity.175 
IV. Conclusion 
The Hughes Court docket books thus shed valuable new light on each of the major sets of 
cases decided during the 1936 Term. For the minimum wages cases, the docket books help us to 
reconstruct an account of the Court’s deliberations highlighting three salient features. First, that 
the failure to assemble a majority to sustain the New York minimum wage statute in Tipaldo 
was attributable to Hughes’s extreme reluctance to overrule a precedent and his insistence on 
distinguishing the statute invalidated in Adkins, coupled with Roberts’s insistence that there was 
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the analysis recently provided by Michele Landis Dauber, The Sympathetic State: Disaster Relief 
and the Origins of the American Welfare State 176–84 (2013). For contemporary commentary 
viewing the Social Security Cases as consistent with antecedent fiscal power precedents, see, for 
example, Paul Huser, Comment, Constitutional Law—Validity of Social Security Taxes, 16 Tex 
L Rev 224, 225 (1938) (distinguishing the taxes imposed in Steward Machine and Butler on the 
ground that the former tax, unlike the latter, was “not earmarked for any particular purpose nor 
set aside to be used to pay the benefits provided for by the Act, but may be used to pay the 
general costs of the Federal Government, as is the case generally with any internal revenue 
collections”); Recent Decision, Constitutional Law—Scope of the National Spending Power— 
Validity of Federal Old-Age Benefit Appropriations under Social Security Act, 37 Colum L Rev 
1206, 1208 (1937) (“In basing its decision [in Helvering] on the general welfare clause, the 
Court established as a rule of law the Hamiltonian conception of the spending power, which it 
had already adopted in dicta in the A.A.A. case”); Elbert R. Gilliom, Comment, The Federal-
State System of Unemployment Compensation Under the Social Security Act, 35 Mich L Rev 
1306, 1311–13 (1937) (detailing the manner in which the Act’s unemployment compensation 
provisions were drafted so as to avoid constitutional pitfalls, and concluding that “the Court in 
[Steward Machine] properly distinguished the invalid AAA processing tax on the ground that 
since the proceeds were earmarked for the benefit of individual farmers complying with 
prescribed conditions, the latter was not a true tax, but part of a scheme to regulate agricultural 
production without the consent of the state affected”); Roger Sherman Hoar, Note, Constitutional 
Law—By-Products of the Social Security Decisions, 21 Marq L Rev 215, 215 (1937) 
(“Economists and experts on constitutional law were not surprised at the two unemployment 
compensation opinions of the United States Supreme Court rendered on May 24, 1937, for it had 
been expected that both the Alabama unemployment compensation law and Title IX of the Social 
Security Act would be sustained by a narrow margin”). 
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no constitutionally significant distinction to be drawn and that the New York law could not be 
upheld unless there were a majority prepared to overrule Adkins. Second, that even though the 
Court was not asked to overrule Adkins in West Coast Hotel, Hughes’s leadership in persuading 
his colleagues to confront and abandon that precedent made it possible to assemble a majority to 
uphold the Washington statute. And third, that the uproar of popular disapproval that followed 
in the wake of the Tipaldo decision played a role in persuading Hughes that West Coast Hotel 
presented a substantial federal question meriting a notation of probable jurisdiction. 
Though the docket books do not shed much new light on the doctrinal dimensions of the 
Court’s deliberations in the Labor Board Cases, they do reveal that Hughes delayed the 
conference discussion and initial voting on those cases for two weeks, making it possible for the 
justices to acquire and digest information about the Court-packing plan’s prospects that would 
have been unavailable to them had the conference been held according to the Court’s ordinary 
course of business.  
These revelations speak principally to questions of causation. What can be said of the 
claim that the justices wrought a “Constitutional Revolution” in the spring of 1937? Let us take 
each of the principal sets of cases in turn. To be sure, West Coast Hotel overruled Adkins v 
Children’s Hospital, eliminating that strand of substantive due process from the Court’s 
jurisprudence. But a few observations help to place the significance of that event in proper 
perspective. First, several of the principal precedents comprising Lochner-Era substantive due 
process had been retired well before the spring of 1937. Constitutional restrictions on 
maximum-hours legislation were effectively discarded in 1917, when the Court upheld a 
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working-hours limitation of general applicability in Bunting v Oregon.176 Though Lochner 
would be cited as a live authority in Adkins six years later,177 never again would it be relied 
upon to invalidate legislation prescribing maximum hours of work. As far as such legislation 
was concerned, Chief Justice William Howard Taft was accurate in his view that Bunting had 
overruled Lochner sub silentio.178 Similarly, in 1930, the Court upheld provisions of the 
Railway Labor Act of 1926 that protected the rights of railway employees to organize and 
bargain collectively, and affirmed a lower court order requiring a railroad to reinstate employees 
it had discharged for engaging in lawful union activities.179 This effectively overruled the 1908 
decision of Adair v United States,180 which had invalidated on due process grounds a federal 
statute prohibiting railroad companies from “unjustly discriminat[ing] against any employee 
because of his union membership,”181 and thereby removed due process obstacles to national 
collective bargaining legislation. And in the 1934 decision of Nebbia v New York, the justices 
abandoned a long line of decisions restricting price regulation to a narrow category of 
businesses “affected with a public interest.”182 By the time that West Coast Hotel was handed 
down, much of the “revolution” in due process jurisprudence already had occurred. 
Second, the centrality of Adkins to Lochner-Era substantive due process is easily 
exaggerated. When Oregon’s minimum wage statute for women was challenged before the 
                                                          
176 243 US 426 (1917). 
177 261 US at 545, 548–50. 
178 Adkins v Children’s Hospital, 261 US at 563–64 (Taft, CJ, dissenting). 
179 Texas & N.O. R. Co v Brotherhood of Ry. & Steamship Clerks, 281 US 548 (1930). 
180 208 US 161 (1908). See also Coppage v Kansas, 236 US 1 (1915) (invalidating on due 
process grounds a state statute prohibiting employers from requiring employees to sign contracts 
promising not to join a union). 
181 30 Stat 424, 428 (1898). 
182 291 US 502 (1934). 
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Court in 1917,183 there were five justices who believed it was constitutional. However, one of 
these, Justice Brandeis, had served as counsel to the State in the lower court proceedings before 
his appointment to the Court, and therefore had to recuse himself from participation on appeal. 
As a result, the Oregon Supreme Court’s judgment upholding the statute was affirmed by an 
equally divided Court. This saved the statute from invalidation, but had no precedential 
effect.184 By the time Adkins reached the Court six years later, the tribunal had undergone 
significant changes in personnel, and a new, bare majority to strike down the District of 
Columbia’s statute was unconstrained by any prior decision on the issue.185 When one member 
of that majority, Justice Joseph McKenna, was replaced by Stone in 1925, there were again five 
justices who believed that Adkins had been wrongly decided. Indeed, internal Court documents 
previously unavailable to the public reveal that the authority of Adkins appears to have survived 
challenges in 1925 and 1927 only because four of these justices felt bound by stare decisis to 
uphold the recent precedent.186 After Nebbia was decided in 1934, many commentators 
expressed the view that a majority of the justices was poised to overrule Adkins,187 which again 
survived in 1936 for the reasons discussed above. Many justices who were invested in other 
                                                          
183 Stettler v O’Hara, 243 US 629 (1917). 
184 See Alexander Bickel and Benno C. Schmidt, The Judiciary and Responsible Government, 
1910-1921, 592–603 (1984). 
185 See Thomas Reed Powell, The Judiciality of Minimum Wage Legislation, 37 Harv L Rev 545, 
547–52 (1924) (surmising that there was a Court majority for sustaining minimum wage 
legislation until June of 1922, and that the appeal in Adkins might have been heard and an 
opinion upholding the statute rendered had the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia not 
ordered rehearing and reargument after its initial decision upholding the measure). 
186 See Cushman, 2015 Sup Ct Rev at 381–83 (cited in note 2). 
187 See note 26. At least one commentator detected such a majority in 1931, when the Court 
upheld a statute regulating the commissions paid to agents selling fire insurance in O’Gorman & 
Yong v Hartford Fire Ins Co, 282 US 251 (1931). See Comment, 45 Harv L Rev 643, 644 




strands substantive due process were fully prepared to uphold minimum wage legislation. There 
were several occasions during the so-called Lochner Era when such legislation might have been 
sustained, and the fact that the prohibition on minimum wage laws was adopted and perpetuated 
was the consequence only of these fortuitous vicissitudes.188 
Third, and relatedly, the abandonment of that prohibition in West Coast Hotel did not 
signal a desertion of the larger enterprise of economic substantive due process. For the 
remainder of their judicial careers, Hughes and Roberts continued to cast votes to invalidate 
economic regulations on the ground that they deprived the regulated parties of property without 
due process of law,189  denied them the equal protection of the laws190 or the privileges or 
immunities of citizenship,191 or took their property without just compensation.192 Their views on 
                                                          
188 See Powell, 37 Harv L Rev at 547–50 (cited in note 185) (concluding that thirty-five of forty-
five judges and justices hearing challenges to minimum wage laws up to 1924 had voted to 
uphold the statutes). 
189 See R.R. Comm’n of Tex v Rowan & Nichols Oil Co, 310 US 573, 577 (1940) (Roberts and 
Hughes dissenting from opinion holding that oil proration order of Texas Railroad Commission 
did not deprive the company of its property without due process); United States v Rock-Royal 
Co-op, Inc, 307 US 533, 583–87 (1939) (Roberts and Hughes dissenting from opinion upholding 
against a due process challenge an order issued by the Secretary of Agriculture pursuant to the 
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937). See also Thompson v Consolidated Gas 
Utilities Corp, 300 US 55 (1937) (Hughes and Roberts join opinion invalidating gas proration 
order of Texas Railroad commission on the ground that it deprived the company of its property 
without due process). 
190 See Charleston Fed Savings & Loan Association v Alderson, 324 US 182, 192–93 
(1945) (Roberts dissenting from opinion upholding tax assessments against equal protection 
challenge); Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins Co v Harrison, 301 US 459 (1937) (Hughes 
joining opinion invalidating Georgia statute imposing differing regulations on stock and mutual 
insurance companies). 
191 See Madden v Kentucky, 309 US 83, 93–94 (1940) (Roberts dissenting from opinion 
upholding state tax against equal protection and privileges or immunities challenges). 
192 See United States v Willow Power Co, 324 US 499, 511–15 (1945) (Roberts and Stone 
dissenting from opinion holding that government action reducing the flow of water available to 
an electrical power plant did not constitute a taking requiring compensation under the Fifth 
Amendment); United States v Commodore Park, Inc, 324 US 386, 393 (1945) (Roberts 
dissenting from opinion holding that the Fifth Amendment did not require compensation of 
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these matters no longer prevailed, but only because Roosevelt’s replacement of their former 
colleagues with justices who rejected such doctrinal commitments had relegated them to the 
Court’s minority. Had Hughes and Roberts had their way, however, vestiges of economic 
substantive due process and its allied doctrines would have remained. 
With respect to the Labor Board Cases, three principal points should be borne in mind. 
First, though many scholars193 and some contemporary federal judges194 have understood those 
decisions as marking reversals or substantial departures from the Court’s established Commerce 
Clause precedents, many contemporary observers saw the opinions in those cases as fully 
consistent with prevailing doctrine. Those taking such a view included Solicitor General Stanley 
Reed;195 Charles Fahy, the General Counsel to the NLRB who approved and oversaw the 
                                                          
riparian landowner whose property was reduced in market value but not invaded by government 
dredging operation). 
193 See, for example, Murphy, The Constitution in Crisis Times at 153–54 (cited in note 42); 
William H. Swindler, 2 Court and Constitution in the Twentieth Century 99–100, 137 (1969); 
Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Supreme Court “Packing” Plan at 94 (cited in note 92); 
Cortner, The Wagner Act Cases at vi, 176–77, 188 (cited in note 63); Murphy, Congress and the 
Court at 65 (cited in note 108); Robert McCloskey, The American Supreme Court 176–77, 224 
(1960); Schwartz, The Supreme Court: Constitutional Revolution in Retrospect at 16, 35 (cited in 
note 134); Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law at 455, 458 (cited in note 21); Rodell, 
Nine Men at 249–50 (cited in note 63); Wright, The Growth of American Constitutional Law at 
179, 222 (cited in note 63); Robert H. Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy 191–92, 
218, 235 (1941); Corwin, Constitutional Revolution, Ltd at 53, 72 (cited in note 134); Corwin, 
Court over Constitution at 156, n 60 (cited in note 63); Alsop and Catledge, The 168 Days at 
143, 146 (cited in note 69). 
194 In the wake of the Labor Board Cases, the following decisions either explicitly stated or 
implicitly suggested that Carter v Carter Coal Co, 298 US 238 (1936), had been thereby 
overruled: Humble Oil & Refining Co v NLRB, 113 F2d 85, 88–89 (5th Cir 1940); NLRB v 
Crowe Coal Co, 104 F2d 633, 637–39 (8th Cir 1939); NLRB v Kentucky Fire Brick Co, 99 F2d 
89, 91–92 (6th Cir 1938); NLRB v Carlisle Lumber Co, 94 F2d 138, 144 (9th Cir 1937); NLRB 
v Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co, 91 F2d 790, 792–93 (9th Cir 1937); Edwards v United States, 91 
F2d 767, 780 (9th Cir 1937); Divine v Levy, 39 F Supp 44, 48 (WD La 1941). 
195 Stanley Reed, Memorandum for the Attorney General, Apr 22, 1937, National Archives, 
Washington, DC, Dept of Justice 114-115-2, quoted in Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
Supreme Court “Packing” Plan at 318–19 (cited in note 92) (“I do not see any clear 
inconsistency between Wagner on the one hand and the Guffey or N.R.A. decision on the other. 
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The Wagner decision is based on the right to remedy situations which obstruct or tend to obstruct 




Agency’s litigation strategy;196 many commentators in the law review literature;197 and several 
lower federal court judges appointed by presidents of both political parties.198 Second, between 
                                                          
196 Charles Fahy, Notes on Developments in Constitutional Law, 1936-1949, 38 Geo L J 1, 11 
(1949) (“My own view was at the time and is now that the Labor Board Cases constituted no 
departure from the past, unless the very recent past, and that indeed they were distinguishable 
from the Carter Coal case. The principles laid down in earlier cases, cited and quoted in detail in 
the Labor Board Cases, seemed directly applicable”). See also Peter Irons, The New Deal 
Lawyers 252–53, 258 (1982) (Fahy was confident that the superior draftsmanship of the NLRA 
would meet with the approval of Hughes and Roberts and that they would vote to uphold the 
statute, and “encouraged his staff to prepare their arguments on the assumption that an 
unfavorable decision in Carter would not invalidate the Wagner Act”); Leonard, A Search for a 
Judicial Philosophy at 243 (cited in note 19) (quoting Fahy as stating in a 1963 interview that 
“the Wagner Act should have been sustained on the basis of precedents…and I am not inclined 
to attribute the fact that it was sustained to anything but that it was believed to be 
constitutional”). 
197 The following publications viewed the Labor Board decisions as resting on the established 
doctrine, which had formed the basis of the NLRB’s legal strategy, that Congress could regulate 
intrastate activities situated in a “stream,” “flow,” or “current” of interstate commerce: Donald R. 
Harter, Note, Constitutional Law: A Survey of Recent Decisions on the Commerce Clause, 26 
Cornell L Q 464, 466–67 (1941); Walter L. Daykin, Interstate Commerce as Defined in the 
National Labor Relations Act, 19 BU L Rev 586, 598 (1939); Paul H. Douglas and Joseph 
Hackman, The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 I, 53 Pol Sci Q 491, 493 (1938); Note, 
Interstate Commerce: Jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board, 26 Cal L Rev 273, 
274 (1938); P.N. Cooper, Comment, Constitutional Law – Interstate Commerce – National 
Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, 11 S Cal L Rev 240, 250–52 (1938); Burton A. Finberg, Note, 17 
BU L Rev 710, 721 (1937); Warren Woods and Altha Connor Wheatley, The Wagner Act 
Decisions – A Charter of Liberty for Labor?, 5 Geo Wash L Rev 846, 853–54 (1937); Jane 
Alvies, The Commerce Power – From Gibbons v Ogden to the Wagner Act Cases, 3 Ohio St L J 
307, 307–08 (1937). Others, while not using the terms “stream,” “flow,” or “current,” 
nevertheless emphasized the importance of the interstate transits of materials and products both 
to and from the plants in question. See John J. Trenam, Note, Commerce Power since the 
Schechter Case, 31 Geo L J 201, 205 (1943); D.J. Farage, That Which “Directly” Affects 
Interstate Commerce, 42 Dickinson L R 1, 8–9 (1937). Scholars taking such views therefore 
doubted that A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp v United States, 295 US 495 (1935), or Carter had 
been overruled. See, for example, Alvies, 3 Ohio St L J at 309, 319–20; Joseph H. Mueller, 
Businesses Subject to the National Labor Relations Act, 35 Mich L Rev 1286, 1297–98 (1937); 
Note, Constitutional Law – Interstate Commerce – Constitutionality of National Labor Relations 
Act as Applied to Manufacturing, 6 Brooklyn L Rev 467, 469 (1937). See also Lloyd Garrison, 
Government and Labor: The Latest Phase, 37 Colum L Rev 897, 898–99 (1937); Mason, Harlan 
Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law at 553 (cited in note 21). 
198 See United States v Wrightwood Dairy Co, 123 F2d 100, 103 (7th Cir 1941) (Schechter still 
good law); United States v Adler’s Creamery, Inc, 107 F2d 987, 989 (2d Cir 1939) (Schechter 
and Carter still good law); Moore v Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 90 F2d 735, 736–40 (7th Cir 
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1938 and 1940 the Court’s commerce power decisions proceeded along rather conventional 
lines of doctrinal analysis pertaining to federal legislative jurisdiction over interstate marketing 
and transportation. Doctrinal innovation was not necessary to sustain the statutes challenged 
before the Court in those years.199 And third, when Congress asserted genuinely novel claims of 
regulatory authority over manufacturing and agriculture with the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(FLSA)200 and the 1941 amendments201 to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938,202 several 
of the justices did not regard the Labor Board decisions as providing adequate constitutional 
foundation for those measures. Instead, they genuinely struggled with the Commerce Clause 
issues that those statutes raised. It was only with difficulty and reluctance that Hughes, the 
author of the Labor Board opinions, ultimately joined Stone’s opinion upholding congressional 
power to regulate the wages and hours of factory employees engaged in “production for 
interstate commerce” in United States v Darby Lumber Co.203 And even a Court now dominated 
by Roosevelt appointees required reargument and a good deal of soul-searching before a 
majority could be assembled to uphold federal regulation of the growth of wheat for home 
consumption on Roscoe Filburn’s farm.204 Darby (1941) cited the Labor Board Cases only once 
                                                          
1937) (Schechter and Carter still good law); United States v Barr & Bloomfield Shoe Mfg Co, 
35 F Supp 75, 77–78 (Dist NH 1940) (Schechter and Carter still good law); United States v F.W. 
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in passing;205 Wickard v Filburn (1942) did not cite them at all.206 The justices of the early 
1940s treated the Labor Board Cases not as a germinal manifesto on the scope of federal power, 
but instead as yesterday’s news. 
Finally, the docket books provide extensive documentation of the Court’s deliberations in 
the Social Security Cases. Here we see the justices speaking for themselves and only to one 
another, almost certainly without expectation that the contents of their discussion ever would be 
disclosed to the public. Justice Butler’s notes of the conference reveal that the jurists did not 
regard their decisions upholding the federal statute as repudiating the positions that they had 
taken in United States v Butler, nor as in any other way marking a new departure in the 
constitutional law governing congressional fiscal powers. Both Van Devanter and Sutherland 
were in the majority in Helvering v Davis, and both their comments at conference and their 
published dissent in Steward Machine make clear their agreement with the majority’s resolution 
of the fiscal power issues that the case presented. The majority applied standard taxing and 
spending power doctrine in utterly conventional ways. From the perspective of the seven 
justices of the majority, so far as the fiscal powers were concerned, there simply was no 
“constitutional revolution” to explain. 
There can be no doubt that the period between the Wall Street Crash of 1929 and the 
Allied victory in World War II witnessed significant transformations in American constitutional 
law. Congressional power under the Commerce Clause became virtually plenary, executive 
authority was significantly enhanced, the remnants of economic substantive due process were 
retired, dormant Commerce Clause restraints on states and localities were relaxed, and the Court 
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became more ardent in the defense of civil rights and civil liberties. None of this can be 
gainsaid. But thanks in part to the revelations discovered in the newly-available Hughes Court 
docket books, the longstanding claim that the Nation underwent a “Constitutional Revolution” 
in the spring of 1937 appears exceedingly weak indeed. 
